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Reason against Truth
Abstract: The paper explores the general relationship between reason (here:
epistemic rationality) and truth. It centers on the question of whether there
can be conflicts between reason and truth, and on the forms such conflicts
may take. Are there philosophically interesting examples of such conflicts?
Rationality is a normative concept, and the language of obligation is as appli-
cable to it as it is to morality. Consider, in particular, epistemic rationality. The
language of obligation applied to epistemic rationality enables us to distinguish
the following four pairs of prominent constituents of epistemic rationality:
1. being rationally obligated (O) to believe p;¹ being rationally obligated not to
believe p; or in other words: O(Bp); O(ØBp);
2. being rationally obligated to believe non-p; being rationally obligated not to
believe non-p; or in other words: O(BØp), O(ØBØp);
3. being rationally permitted (P) to believe p; being rationally permitted not to
believe p; or in other words: P(Bp); P(ØBp);
4. being rationally permitted to believe non-p; being rationally permitted not to
believe non-p; or in other words: P(BØp); P(ØBØp).
There are logical equivalence relations between some of these eight constituents.
On the basis of the general schematic principles P(A) ≡ ØO(ØA) and P(ØA) ≡
ØO(A), we have:
P(Bp) ≡ ØO(ØBp) P(ØBp) ≡ ØO(Bp)
 Note that “p” is here a variable for propositions (and not a schematic letter that represents a
sentence). As a consequence, the expression “that p” is nonsensical (in contrast to the ex-
pression “that (p is true)”): “that”, in the relevant function, must be followed by a sentence, a
closed sentence or an open one, not by a singular term. An expression that has the form “that A”
is – for any true or false (English) sentence that is substituted for “A” – a name of a proposition,
and can be substituted for “p”. In what follows, “O(…)” will be treated as a sentence-operator
(forming a sentence from a sentence), “B…”, however, as a predicate (forming a sentence from a
singular term). For the sake of brevity, the symbol of negation “Ø” will be used in a double
function: as a sentence-operator (ØA: not-A) and as the negation-functor for propositions (Øp:
non-p). Both uses occur side by side in O(ØBØp), for example.
P(BØp) ≡ ØO(ØBØp) P(ØBØp) ≡ ØO(BØp).
These equivalence relations allow us to reduce the four permission-constituents
to the negations of the four obligation-constituents. Furthermore, on the basis of
the general schematic principle P1: O(A) ⊃ ØO(ØA), and its contrapositive P1c:
O(ØA) ⊃ ØO(A) (which is logically equivalent to P1), we have:
P1.1 O(Bp) ⊃ ØO(ØBp) P1.1c O(ØBp) ⊃ ØO(Bp)
P1.2 O(BØp) ⊃ ØO(ØBØp) P1.2c O(ØBØp) ⊃ ØO(BØp).
In other words:
O(Bp) is contrary to O(ØBp)
entails entails
ØO(ØBp) is subcontrary to ØO(Bp)
O(BØp) is contrary to O(ØBØp)
entails entails
ØO(ØBØp) is subcontrary to ØO(BØp)
There are, finally, logical implication relations between some of the eight constit-
uents which, in contrast to the previously considered logical relations, connect
“Bp” with “BØp”, and which are, in contrast to the previously considered logical
relations, specific to epistemic rationality, that is, to the type of rational obliga-
tion and permission that concerns propositional belief:²
P2 O(Bp) ⊃ O(ØBØp) P2c ØO(ØBØp) ⊃ ØO(Bp)
P3 O(BØp) ⊃ O(ØBp) P3c ØO(ØBp) ⊃ ØO(BØp)
The eight constituents of epistemic rationality
O(Bp) ØO(Bp) [:= P(ØBp)]
O(ØBp) ØO(ØBp) [:= P(Bp)]
O(BØp) ØO(BØp) [:= P(ØBØp)]
 It would perhaps have been more appropriate to speak of doxastic rationality. On the other
hand, the designation “epistemic” emphasizes very appropriately that the rationality in question
has something to do with truth.
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O(ØBØp) ØO(ØBØp) [:=P(BØp)]
can be combined in 16 not obviously self-contradictory ways to form states of
epistemic rationality with respect to the proposition concerned (that is, with re-
spect to the proposition p). The possible states of epistemic rationality are
those that are marked “consistent” in the following listing:
O(Bp) O(ØBp) O(BØp) O(ØBØp)
Y(es) Y Y Y inconsistent
Y Y Y N(o) inconsistent
Y Y N Y inconsistent
Y Y N N inconsistent
Y N Y Y inconsistent
Y N Y N inconsistent³
Y N N Y consistent
Y N N N inconsistent
N Y Y Y inconsistent
N Y Y N consistent
N Y N Y consistent
N Y N N consistent
N N Y Y inconsistent
N N Y N inconsistent
N N N Y consistent
N N N N consistent
In other words,
R1: O(Bp) ∧ ØO(ØBp) ∧ ØO(BØp) ∧ O(ØBØp) i. e., O(Bp)
R2: ØO(Bp) ∧ O(ØBp) ∧ O(BØp) ∧ ØO(ØBØp) i. e., O(BØp)
R3: ØO(Bp) ∧ O(ØBp) ∧ ØO(BØp) ∧ O(ØBØp) i. e., O(ØBp) ∧ O(ØBØp)
R4: ØO(Bp) ∧ O(ØBp) ∧ ØO(BØp) ∧ ØO(ØBØp) i. e., O(ØBp) ∧ ØO(BØp) ∧
ØO(ØBØp)
R5: ØO(Bp) ∧ ØO(ØBp) ∧ ØO(BØp) ∧ O(ØBØp) i. e., ØO(Bp) ∧ ØO(ØBp) ∧
O(ØBØp)
R6: ØO(Bp) ∧ ØO(ØBp) ∧ ØO(BØp) ∧ ØO(ØBØp) [not simplifiable]
are the six possible states of epistemic rationality (with respect to the proposition
p, and with respect to a certain – implicit – subject of belief [believer] and a cer-
tain – implicit – moment of time).
 To see the inconsistency in this line, consider that O(Bp) ⊃ ØO(BØp) is a logical consequence
of P and P.c.
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On the other hand, there are four possible states of belief (with respect to the
proposition p, and with the respect to the same – the aforementioned – subject
of belief and moment of time):
F1: Bp ∧ BØp
F2: Bp ∧ ØBØp
F3: ØBp ∧ BØp
F4: ØBp ∧ ØBØp
The possible states of epistemic rationality, as listed above, are consecutively num-
bered: R1 – R6, and the possible states of belief, as listed above, are also consecu-
tively numbered: F1 – F4. In what follows I will refer to those numberings.
A possible state of belief F is rational with respect to a possible state of epis-
temic rationality R if, and only if, F fulfils all the rational obligations that are in-
trinsic to R.
Thus, F1– that is, Bp ∧ BØp – is not rational with respect to R1, R3, R5, since
F1 does not fulfil the obligation O(ØBØp), which is intrinsic to R1, R3, R5. And F1
is also not rational with respect to R2, R3, R4, since F1 does not fulfil the obliga-
tion O(ØBp), which is intrinsic to R2, R3, R4. It may seem that F1 is rational with
respect to R6. Not so; for O(ØBp ∨ ØBØp) is an obligation that is intrinsic to every
state of epistemic rationality, since it is purely a matter of the logic of rational
obligation;⁴ F1 does not fulfil that obligation.
Now, F2 – that is, Bp ∧ ØBØp – is not rational with respect to R2, R3, R4,
since F2 does not fulfil the obligation O(ØBp), which is intrinsic to R2, R3, R4.
But F2 is rational with respect to R1, R5, R6.
In turn, F3 – that is, ØBp ∧ BØp – is not rational with respect to R1, R3, R5,
since F3 does not fulfil the obligation O(ØBØp), which is intrinsic to R1, R3, R5.
But F3 is rational with respect to R2, R4, R6.
Finally, F4 – that is, ØBp ∧ ØBØp – is not rational with respect to R1, R2,
since F4 does not fulfil the obligation O(Bp), which is intrinsic to R1, and not
the obligation O(BØp), which is intrinsic to R2. But F4 is rational with respect
to R3, R4, R5, R6.
These results can be perspicuously summed up in a diagram:
 Note that O(ØBp ∨ ØBØp) is logically equivalent to O(Bp ⊃ ØBØp). O(Bp) ⊃ O(ØBØp) – that is,
P – can be taken to follow logically from O(Bp ⊃ ØBØp).
176 Uwe Meixner
F F F F
R NR R NR NR
R NR NR R NR
R NR NR NR R
R NR NR R R
R NR R NR R
R NR R R R
The six possible states of epistemic rationality R1 – R6 and the four possible
states of belief F1 – F4 can be combined to form 24 possible epistemic-rationali-
ty-and-fact situations: R1 ∧ F1, R1 ∧ F2, …, R6 ∧ F4. Each of these epistemic-ra-
tionality-and-fact situations either has the character “rational” or the character
“irrational”. Which one of these two characters it has can be read off the above
diagram:What, for example, is the rationality-character of R3 ∧ F3? Go to the row
R3 and the column F3, and look were they intersect: There is an “NR” there, and
therefore R3 ∧ F3 has the character “irrational”. In the same way it can be deter-
mined that R4 ∧ F4 (say) has the character “rational”. It is easily seen from the
diagram that ten of the epistemic-rationality-and-fact situations are rational, and
fourteen irrational. Observe also that some possible states of epistemic rational-
ity allow more rational freedom than others (count the “R”s in their rows), and
that some possible states of belief are logically more likely to be rational than
others (count the “R”s in their columns).
Since R1– R6 logically exclude each other, and also F1– F4 logically exclude
each other (with respect to the same subject of belief and moment of time, and
the same proposition p), only one of the 24 possible epistemic-rationality-and-
fact situations can be actual – with respect to the same subject of belief and mo-
ment of time, and the same proposition p. Which one of the 24 possible episte-
mic-rationality-and-fact situations will be the actual one depends on the propo-
sition p, on the subject of belief concerned and the relevant moment of time,
and, of course, on the pertinent normative facts of epistemic rationality and
non-normative facts of belief. Note that only if it is specified which of the 24 pos-
sible epistemic-rationality-and-fact situations is the actual one, can one speak
simpliciter of the epistemic rationality or irrationality of a given subject of belief,
at a certain time, with respect to a given proposition.
Philosophical positions arise. Consider radical skepticism. For radical skeptics,
epoché is the rationally obligatory epistemic attitude with respect to any proposition.
In other words, radical skeptics hold that, for any proposition p and any (intelligent)
Truth against Reason, and Reason against Truth 177
human subject of belief ⁵ and any time, it is rationally obligatory not to believe p,
and also rationally obligatory not to believe non-p. In other words again, radical
skeptics hold that R3 – i.e., O(ØBp) ∧ O(ØBØp) – is the obtaining (or actual)
state of epistemic rationality for any proposition p, no matter what is the time
and who (among us human beings) is the subject of belief.
If R3 is the obtaining state of rationality for all propositions, then most of us
cannot escape being irrational with respect to some propositions; for most of us
cannot avoid believing some propositions, positive and negative ones. I, for ex-
ample, cannot avoid believing that I exist, and that 2 is not identical with 1. (You
may have your own favorites.) Indeed, the rationality of the radical skeptics
themselves is undermined by their very position if it is true; for they themselves,
qua radical skeptics, certainly believe a certain proposition (namely, the propo-
sition that, for all propositions p and all times, one is rationally obligated not to
believe p and also rationally obligated not to believe non-p).⁶ This means that
radical skeptics, if they are right (i.e., if radical skepticism is true), are bound
to be epistemically irrational with respect to the very proposition they qua rad-
ical skeptics believe (for the truth of that proposition requires that, rationally,
they ought not to believe that proposition – but they do). It is important to
note that there is no inconsistency here. If a radical skeptic believes that, for
all propositions p and all times, one is rationally obligated not to believe p
and also rationally obligated not to believe non-p, and if it is true that, for all
propositions p and all times, one is rationally obligated not to believe p and
also rationally obligated not to believe non-p – then there is no inconsistency
in this; then the skeptic is simply right. But he is also epistemically irrational.
The case of the radical skeptic who is right in his skepticism is a particulary
striking example of how truth and reason may collide: Someone believes what is,
in fact, true; but the logical consequence of his believing what is true is that he is
being epistemically irrational (in the sense that he is not fulfilling obligations of
epistemic rationality which are incurred by the very fact that what he believes is
true). Here is another example of a possible conflict between reason and truth,
an example which is much more commonplace than the previous one. Suppose
it is rationally obligatory, for any (human) subject of belief, to believe that God
does not exist. If so, then R2 is the obtaining state of epistemic rationality with
respect to the proposition that God does not exist, and there is only one way for a
 In what follows it is assumed, for the sake of brevity, that all subjects of belief – in particular,
all human beings – are always intelligent.
 If with every proposition p also non-p is a proposition (as seems right), the radical skeptics’
position can also be expressed by “for all propositions p and all times, one is obligated not to
believe p”.
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subject of belief to be rational about that proposition: this is F3, that is, not to
believe that God exists, and to believe that God does not exist. Many people, usu-
ally philosophers, have no difficulty at all to comply with the requirements of
reason here. But suppose now that God does exist – in spite of the (supposed)
fact that it is rationally obligatory to believe that God does not exist. This
would mean that reason requires one to believe something that is not true.
Can true reason counsel, indeed decree, against truth? Can it be rationally obli-
gatory to believe something that is not true?
One is tempted to say “no” and to postulate the following principles that
connect the rational obligation to believe a proposition with the truth of that
proposition:
P4 O(Bp) ⊃ p is true [i.e., Øp is not true]
P5 O(BØp) ⊃ Øp is true [i.e., p is not true]. [pair 1]⁷
These postulates may even be strengthened:
P6 O(ØBØp) ⊃ p is true [i.e., Øp is not true]
P7 O(ØBp) ⊃ Øp is true [i.e., p is not true]. [pair 2]⁸
The first pair of postulates follows from the second pair in view of the uncontro-
versial principles
P2 O(Bp) ⊃ O(ØBØp)
P3 O(BØp) ⊃ O(ØBp)
that have already been introduced and made use of. And one can argue for the sec-
ond pair in the following manner: Can it be rationally obligatory not to believe
something even though it is true? Can true reason counsel against truth? It seems
not. Thus, if reason says “Thou shalt not believe that p” and is right, p has to be
not true, and non-p, therefore, true. And if reason says “Thou shalt not believe
that non-p” and is right, non-p has to be not true, and p, therefore, true.
 Pair  obviously entails ØO(Bp) ∨ ØO(BØp), or in other words: O(Bp) ⊃ ØO(BØp) – which is an
unproblematic principle that is also a consequence of P in combination with P.c: O(Bp) ⊃
O(ØBØp) and O(ØBØp) ⊃ ØO(BØp).
 Pair  obviously entails ØO(ØBp) ∨ ØO(ØBØp), or in other words: O(ØBp) ⊃ ØO(ØBØp) –
which, if true, would for every proposition render skepticism (or agnosticism) impossible as
an obligation of epistemic rationality; for according to O(ØBp) ⊃ ØO(ØBØp), R cannot be an ob-
taining state of epistemic rationality for any proposition.
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Principles P4 – P7, if accepted, have interesting consequences. The moral ob-
ligation to do something, or not to do something, does not entail that it is done
in fact, or not done in fact. Correspondingly, the rational obligation to believe, or
not to believe, a certain proposition does not entail that it is believed in fact, or
not believed in fact. But, if P4 is accepted, the rational obligation to believe a
certain proposition entails that it is true, and if P7 is a accepted the rational ob-
ligation not to believe a certain proposition entails that it is not true. There is no
parallel of this on the side of morality; it is peculiar to epistemic rationality.
What are other consequences of accepting P4 – P7? For one thing, it be-
comes quite impossible to justly accuse people of being irrational because
they believe a certain proposition. For example, the atheist or agnostic cannot
with justice tell the believer that she is being irrational by believing that God ex-
ists. For the believer can legitimately defend herself by answering that there is no
rational obligation for her (or anybody) not to believe that God exists, and there-
fore no rational obligation to believe that God does not exist, either. Why? Be-
cause, says the believer, it is just not true that God does not exist.⁹
The dilemma is this: On the one hand, the rational obligation to believe p is
to be a good epistemic indicator of the truth of p. For that seems to be the whole
point of the rational obligation to believe a certain proposition. On the other
hand, the truth of p is to be a conditio sine qua non of the rational obligation
to believe p. For it would seem that true reason cannot decree against truth.
But if the rational obligation to believe p is to be a good epistemic indicator
of the truth of p, then the truth of p cannot also be a conditio sine qua non of
the rational obligation to believe p. For if the truth of p were a conditio sine
qua non of the rational obligation to believe p, then the rational obligation to be-
lieve p would be drawn into in question already by a sincere claim that p is not
true – and indeed already by a mere uncertainty whether p is true. Clearly, under
such circumstances the rational obligation to believe p cannot be a good episte-
mic indicator of the truth of p.
Consider a similar case, but a case where there is no dilemma. The truth of p is
a conditio sine qua non of knowing that p is true; one cannot know that p is true
without the truth of p. But this makes it quite impossible for knowledge to be a
good epistemic indicator of truth. If one is uncertain whether p is true, one cannot
reasonably say to oneself: “Person X certainly knows that p is true; this indicates
that p is true.” For the uncertainty whether p is true is ipso facto an uncertainty
whether anybody knows that p is true – since the truth of p is a conditio sine qua
 She is using the contrapositives of P and P (i.e., Pc) to arrive at her conclusions: Ø(Øp is
true) ⊃ ØO(ØBp) and ØO(ØBp) ⊃ ØO(BØp).
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non for knowing that p is true. But of course one can reasonably say “It is true. I
know it to be true” or “It is true. N.N. said that he knows it to be true”. The first
is merely an emphatic way of saying “I believe it to be true”, and the second is mere-
ly a compendious way of saying “N.N. believes it to be true, and I share his belief
because N.N. is in this matter an authority for me”.
In resolving the above-presented dilemma for rational epistemic obligation –
which dilemma is a consequence of conflicting conceptual aims – we should,
after all, not follow the example set by knowledge. The similarity between ration-
al obligation to believe and knowledge is far from being strong. Saying that it is
rationally obligatory (for subject X) to believe p is just another way of saying that
there cannot be any reasonable doubt (for X) about p’s being true.¹⁰ But how can
it be the case that there cannot be any reasonable doubt about p’s being true if
this impossibility of reasonable doubt can only be the case if p is true? If the
truth of p were a conditio sine qua non of the rational obligation to believe p,
then, except for the epistemically special propositions (the uncontroversially
true propositions in logic and mathematics),¹¹ it would never be rationally obli-
gatory to believe p; for one must always allow (except in the case of an epistemi-
cally special proposition) that the believed or surmised non-truth of p can rea-
sonably be held against the alleged rational obligation to believe p.
But if the truth of p is not in general a conditio sine qua non of the rational
obligation to believe p, then, indeed, in a considerable number of cases the
claim that there is a rational obligation to believe a certain epistemically non-
special proposition may be true. We may even come to the point that 99.9% of
such claims are true: that in 99.9% of the cases in question there is indeed,
as is claimed, a rational obligation to believe a certain epistemically non-special
proposition – for example, just for the sake of the argument, that God does not
exist, that everything is physical, that there is no incompatibilist freedom of the
will, that life has no ultimate meaning, that there are no objective moral obliga-
tions. But, note, the claim that it is, e.g., rationally obligatory to believe that God
 Saying that it is not rationally obligatory (for subject X) to believe p is just another way of
saying that there can be reasonable doubt (for X) about p’s being true. Saying that it is rationally
obligatory (for X) not to believe p is just another way of saying that there is reasonable doubt (for
X) about p’s being true.
 The proposition that I exist is another epistemically special proposition – a very special one.
It is rationally obligatory to believe that I exist – but it is so only for me: there is no rational
obligation for anyone else (who is human) to believe that I exist. I cannot reasonably doubt
(the truth of) the proposition that I exist, but anyone else (who is human) can reasonably
doubt that proposition. In contrast, it is rationally obligatory for anyone (who is human) to be-
lieve the proposition that +=; no one (who is human) can reasonably doubt that +=.
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does not exist is now in a peculiar sense fallible. By this I do not merely mean that
the obligation-claim itself may be false (I think that it is false, but I have just now
proposed, for the sake of the argument, that it is true); I mean that the claim, though
true, may be nothing more than an imperative of reason against truth.
Consider, finally, a telling parable. By accidental contact with human be-
ings, the idea that there are human beings has touched a population of intelli-
gent termites; call the termites in that population “the alpha-termites”. Yet, in
the course of their history (in which further contact with human beings is for
a very, very long period non-occurrent), the alpha-termites ultimately come to
the following claim: There cannot be any reasonable doubt that there aren’t
any human beings. In other words, it is rationally obligatory, for every alpha-ter-
mite, to believe that human beings do not exist. And this obligation-claim is
even true: It is, indeed, rationally obligatory, for every alpha-termite, to believe
that human beings do not exist. How could it be not rationally obligatory for an
alpha-termite to believe this, given that the truth of a proposition, as was finally
determined in this paper, is not a conditio sine qua non of the rational obligation
to believe it?¹² But, as we human beings know, the imperative of termite-reason in
question is an imperative against truth. The alpha-termites, by the way, never
learned the truth; they were destroyed by human beings before they had any
chance to learn it – which goes to show that there are certainly worse things
than being irrational: being wrong is one of them.
Appendix
(I) Principles in full explicitness:With time-index and subject-index added, P2 –
O(Bp) ⊃ O(ØBØp) – (for example) turns into: Os,t(Bs,tp) ⊃ Os,t(ØBs,tØp). If also the
quantification involved is made fully explicit, P2 turns into "s"t"p(Os,t(Bs,tp) ⊃
Os,t(ØBs,tØp)).
 Still, readers may wonder why there cannot be any reasonable doubt – for the alpha-ter-
mites – that there aren’t any human beings. The savants of the alpha-termites would tell poten-
tial doubters among the alpha-termites (and the savants would tell the truth): () There is not a
shred of dependable evidence for the assumption that there are human beings; () every phe-
nomenon in the (alpha-termite) world can be perfectly explained without assuming that there
are human beings – and entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem; () it is even “inco-
herent” to assume that there are human beings, for human beings “just don’t fit in”. This may
leave one with the impression that it is merely rationally obligatory for every alpha-termite not to
believe that there are human beings – and not that it is rationally obligatory for it to believe that
there aren’t any human beings. But the difference which looks big in logic is very small in prac-
tice – given the truth of (), (), and ().
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(II) If radical skepticism is true, then the radical skeptic is irrational:
() "s"t"p(Os,t(ØBs,tp) ∧ Os,t(ØBs,tØp)) [thesis of radical skepticism]
() q* := that "s"t"p(Os,t(ØBs,tp) ∧ Os,t(ØBs,tØp)) [definition]
() B(s*,t*q*) ∧ ØB(s*,t*Øq*) [s* is a radical skeptic at t*]
() Os*,t*(ØBs*,t*q*) ∧ Os*,t*(ØBs*,t*Øq*) [instantiation of ()]
() s* is irrational at t* with respect to q* [from () and ()]
Here the actual state of epistemic rationality is of the type R3 and the actual state of
belief is of the type F2; therefore the actual situation-of-rationality-and-fact is of the
type R3 ∧ F2 – which is irrational, since F2 is irrational with respect to R3. Replacing
(3) by (3′) – B(s*,t*q*) ∧ B(s*,t*Øq*) – does not help. The only way to escape irration-
ality in the face of (1) is replacing (3) by (3″): ØB(s*,t*q*) ∧ ØB(s*,t*Øq*). But if this is
the actual state of belief of s* at t*, then s* can hardly be called “a radical skeptic”;
otherwise, the famous “man on the street”, who never thinks about epistemological
matters, would turn out to be a radical skeptic.
(III) Prima facie it may seem that “p is true ⊃ O(Bp)” (the converse of P4) is a valid
principle. However, if p is true and it is nevertheless impossible to believe p (for
example, because p just cannot be grasped by the subject of belief) then there is
no obligation to believe p. Likewise, if p is true and p is totally irrelevant for the
subject of belief, then there is no obligation to believe p. Thus, “p is true ⊃
O(Bp)” is certainly not a valid principle; but other valid principles are implicit
in the considerations that show its invalidity, for example: O(Bp) ⊃ ◊(Bp).
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